Formalism of Requirements for Safety-Critical Software: Where Does the
  Benefit Come From? by Habli, Ibrahim & Rae, Andrew
Formalism of Requirements for Safety-Critical Software: 
Where Does the Benefit Come From? 
Ibrahim Habli and Andrew Rae 
Department of Computer Science 
University of York 
York, United Kingdom 
Ibrahim.Habli@york.ac.uk 
Andrew.Rae@york.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Abstract— Safety and assurance standards often rely on the 
principle that requirements errors can be minimised by 
expressing the requirements more formally. Although numerous 
case studies have shown that the act of formalising previously 
informal requirements finds requirements errors, this principle is 
really just a hypothesis. An industrially persuasive causal 
relationship between formalisation and better requirements has 
yet to be established. We describe multiple competing 
explanations for this hypothesis, in terms of the levels of 
precision, re-formulation, expertise, effort and automation that 
are typically associated with formalising requirements. We then 
propose an experiment to distinguish between these explanations, 
without necessarily excluding the possibility that none of them 
are correct. 
Keywords—requirements; software, formal methods, safety; 
certification. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are two main strategies available for evaluating the 
effectiveness of a software standard. Either the standard as a 
whole can be compared to alternatives, or the individual 
practices within the standard can be separately evaluated. This 
position paper describes how the second approach could be 
applied, using one specific practice as an illustrative example. 
Standards for the development of safety-critical software 
typically contain rules for how the software requirements 
should be represented (e.g. [1] [2]). The underlying principle is 
that requirements errors can be minimised by expressing the 
requirements more formally [3]. This principle is really just a 
hypothesis. Whilst there are numerous case studies showing 
that the act of formalising previously informal requirements 
finds requirements errors [4] [5], an industrially persuasive 
causal relationship between formalisation and better 
requirements has yet to be established. 
Understanding this causal relationship is important for a 
number of reasons: 
1. From a practical point of view, formalisation has 
significant cost and effort implications. Using formal 
requirements is a significant intellectual investment 
2. Formalisation addresses a substantial ideological 
divide, with different communities and stakeholders 
taking different entrenched positions 
3. There has been a lot of research effort, but not enough 
studies that directly address the "should we do it" 
question – this question is mostly secondary, and 
therefore addressed as a case-study side-effect rather 
than by decisive experiment [9]. 
II. THE QUESTION TO BE ADDRESSED 
We here have an empirical observation, that application of 
formalisation methods to requirements finds and removes 
requirements errors. We have multiple competing hypotheses 
to explain this observation.  
The first explanation is that the errors are found as a result 
of the degree of precision provided by the increased formality 
in representation. For example, four different levels of 
formalism can be considered: free text, structured text [6], 
semi-formal models [7] and mathematically-based notations 
[4]. 
The second explanation is that the errors are found as a 
result of re-formulation of the requirements, regardless of the 
nature of the new form. This explanation is suggested by the 
fact that all requirements formalisation methods seem capable 
of finding requirements errors. 
The third explanation is that the errors are found as a result 
of expertise. Formal methods are applied by highly qualified 
practitioners expert in those methods, and presumably expert in 
spotting requirements errors.  
The fourth explanation is that the error removal is a simple 
result of effort expended, independent of the method or the 
expertise. 
The fifth explanation is that the errors are found as a result 
of the increase of automation (e.g. the use of modelling tools 
for model-based languages or theorem-provers or model-
checking for mathematically-based languages [8]). 
Our challenge is to design an experiment to distinguish 
between these explanations, without excluding the possibility 
that none of them are correct. 
III. THE EXPERIMENT 
Our experimental method is based around the principle of 
dose-response as an indicator of causality. Given a particular 
set of requirements, participants will be set a task of 
reformulating the requirements and identifying problems. 
Performance will be determined according to the number of 
distinct problems identified with the requirements. Five 
parameters of the task will be set corresponding to the five 
explanations.  
 Since it is possible that more than one of the explanations 
is a causal factor, and that the explanations may in fact 
influence each other, an ideal experiment should consider 
permutations of the parameters rather than simply hold three 
steady and adjust the last parameter.  
Briefly, the parameters are: 
1. Degree of formalism of the new form of the 
requirements; 
2. Difference between the old and new form of 
requirements; 
3. Expertise of the participants; 
4. Time available for the task; and 
5. Degree of automation available for the new form of the 
requirements. 
An explanation will be determined to have causal power if 
increasing the parameter associated with that explanation 
improves performance on the task independently of the other 
parameters. 
IV. THREATS TO VALIDITY 
The internal validity of this experimental approach relies on 
the causal relationships to be, if not linear, at least monotonic. 
If increasing any of the parameters by a small amount improves 
the task performance, but increasing it by a large amount has 
negligible or negative effect, this will be hard to detect. 
The most obvious challenges to the external validity of this 
experiment will relate to the particular set of requirements 
presented as a challenge problem. If finding the errors is too 
easy or too hard, this may decrease or increase the utility of 
formalisation. Formalisation may be good at finding subtle 
errors, but no more useful than informal re-formulation for 
more obvious errors. More broadly, there may be particular 
types of systems or requirements for which formality is more 
useful. Formality may be very effective for control systems, but 
not particularly useful for simple input-output systems or 
complex adaptive systems, for example. 
 The question may be successfully answered in an 
experimental context, but the results may not be industrially 
applicable.  Formalisation requires a precise description of the 
system. What about if the requirements are inherently fluid? 
Freezing the requirements may be harmful. There is a trade-off 
between requirements consistency and requirements 
completeness. From a safety point of view we care about 
“global correctness” (e.g. fitness against intent rather than 
specification), which includes both consistency and 
completeness and covers both requirements verification and 
validation. 
This threat is inherent to our “individual practice” 
approach. If the benefit or detriment of a standard is an 
emergent property of a suite of practices, or even simply of 
having a defined suite of practices, then evaluating the efficacy 
of individual practices will not appropriately evaluate the 
standard, even if all of the practices are rigorously addressed in 
isolation. On the other hand, if benefit or detriment is inherent 
to particular practices, then only an individual practice 
approach will give a true understanding of the efficacy of 
standards. 
V. PRACTICALITY 
What is a reasonable sized task to test the usefulness of 
requirements reformulation? What is a reasonable amount of 
time for the task? How large does each group of participants 
need to be to ensure the results are representative? How many 
different combinations of parameters do we need to test? At 
this point, we do not know the answers to these questions.  
Our suggested approach is peer-design of the experiment. 
This requires finding a “champion” for each of the candidate 
explanations, who has previously expressed support for that 
explanation, and currently stands by that view. If each of the 
champions agrees that the task set and the means of measuring 
performance is a fair way of comparing the explanations, this 
increases confidence in the usefulness of the experiment.  
One pragmatic approach would be to gradually increase the 
expertise of the participants, using students as initial subjects. 
This would allow the practicality of the approach to be 
explored at the same time as refining the parameter 
combinations to be usefully tested with higher expertise 
groups. 
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